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for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
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District Judge:  Hon. Gerald A. McHugh 
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Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE,* Circuit Judges. 
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* The Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie retired from the Court on January 1, 2019, 
after the argument and conference in this case, but before the filing of the opinion.  This 
opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third Circuit 
I.O.P. Chapter 12.   
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OPINION 
_____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Jose Chaves-Leiva filed this appeal to challenge his criminal conviction for illegal 
reentry after removal.  Specifically, he appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss the 
indictment, in which he attempted to attack collaterally his 2008 removal order 
underlying the offense of conviction.  Central to this appeal is the validity of a 
“Stipulated Request for Removal Order and Waiver of Hearing” (the “Stipulated 
Request”) signed by Chaves-Leiva while proceeding pro se.  An Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) determined that his waiver before the immigration court was voluntarily, 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
   
3 
 
knowingly, and intelligently executed and entered the removal order.  The District Court 
held a full hearing including testimony and rejected Chaves-Leiva’s arguments that the 
Stipulated Request he signed was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and concluded 
that his removal was not fundamentally unfair.  We agree and will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of Chaves-Leiva’s motion to dismiss the indictment.   
I. 
Costa Rican native Chaves-Leiva has attempted to enter the United States without 
permission numerous times since the late 1990s.  In 1999, he was apprehended at the 
border six times.  After falsely claiming Mexican citizenship and providing at least two 
aliases and two different dates of birth, Chaves-Leiva was permitted, after those six 
unlawful entries, to return voluntarily to Mexico.   
Chaves-Leiva illegally entered the United States again some time before March 
2001, when he married an American citizen in New Jersey.  In 2007, Chaves-Leiva was 
charged in Ohio with attempted assault.  In February 2008, he was arrested in Ohio again, 
charged with public intoxication, and transferred into the custody of the United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).  On February 29, 2008, Chaves-Leiva 
was served with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), typed in English, and a Notification of 
Rights (“NOR”), typed in Spanish, a language he could read and understand.  The NOR 
informed Chaves-Leiva that he had the right to consult an attorney and the right to a 
removal hearing.  Chaves-Leiva indicated on the NOR his request for a removal hearing 
before an IJ.   
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Nevertheless, on March 11, 2008, prior to any removal hearing, Chaves-Leiva 
signed the Stipulated Request, in which he waived his previously invoked right to a 
hearing.  The Stipulated Request, printed in both English and Spanish, advised Chaves-
Leiva of his right to counsel, identified certain rights that would be waived if the form 
were signed, and explained the consequences of removal pursuant to the stipulation.  It 
also contained the following statements, with the corresponding Spanish translations: 
10.  I request that my removal from the United States be based 
solely on the stipulated order.  By signing this stipulation, I 
understand that I am giving up the right to appear before an 
immigration judge and that I will be removed from the United 
States without a hearing. 
 
. . .  
 
12.  I understand the consequences of this Stipulated Request 
for Order, Waiver of Hearing are that I will be removed from 
the United States.  I make this request voluntarily, knowingly, 
and intelligently. 
 
. . .  
 
16.  ___ I have read or ___ I have had read to me in a language 
I understand, this entire document.  I fully understand its 
consequences.  I submit this request for removal voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently.  I realize that by signing this 
document, I will be removed from the United States. 
 
Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 44–45.  Checkmarks were placed in both blank spaces in the 
Spanish translation of paragraph 16.  Both Chaves-Leiva and an ICE agent signed the 
Stipulated Request, with the latter certifying that he had “explained the contents and 
meaning of th[e] document to [Chaves-Leiva] in the language which [he] underst[ood].”  
J.A. 46.  Chaves-Leiva was not represented by counsel when he executed the form.   
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 On March 17, 2008, acknowledging the language of the Stipulated Request, an IJ 
found Chaves-Leiva’s waiver voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.  Upon a “review of the 
charging document and the written stipulation,” the IJ determined that Chaves-Leiva was 
removable and ordered his removal to Costa Rica.  J.A. 50.  
Chaves-Leiva was removed on April 28, 2008 without contesting his removal in 
any way.  Thereafter, he was found in the United States twice in 2008 and once in 2009.  
Chaves-Leiva was removed after each reentry, but after the second reentry in 2008, he 
was also indicted for, and he pled guilty to, illegally reentering the country.   
In 2017, Chaves-Leiva was found in the United States once again after his 
eleventh illegal entry, according to the record.  He was arrested by the state police in 
Pennsylvania for, inter alia, forgery related to a driver’s license, and subsequently 
indicted in federal court for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1).   
Chaves-Leiva moved to dismiss the indictment by attempting to attack collaterally 
his underlying 2008 removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).  He argued that his removal 
was fundamentally unfair because he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
waive his right to a hearing and to apply for relief from removal in 2008.  The District 
Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss the indictment and heard the 
testimony of, among others, Chaves-Leiva and the ICE agent who provided him with the 
NTA, NOR, and Stipulated Request.  Although the ICE agent did not remember 
processing Chaves-Leiva specifically, he testified as to how he processed immigrants in 
February of 2008.   
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After considering the testimony and the record, the District Court concluded that 
Chaves-Leiva did not establish that his removal was fundamentally unfair, and so it 
denied his motion to dismiss.  It determined that the NOR and the Stipulated Request 
informed Chaves-Leiva in his native language of his rights and of possible avenues for 
relief from removal, and was not persuaded by “his claim that he did not understand his 
rights as of 2008.”  J.A. 13.   
The District Court additionally rejected Chaves-Leiva’s claim that he was 
pressured by ICE into signing the Stipulated Request.  It was persuaded by the ICE 
agent’s testimony that the document is not prepared until an immigrant requests it, and it 
found that Chaves-Leiva requested a meeting with ICE and that that request was marked 
as closed the day after the Stipulated Request was signed.  The court also rejected the 
argument that “the prospect of quick[ly] resol[ving] . . . the case” by signing a Stipulated 
Request “undermined the voluntariness of Mr. Chaves-Leiva’s decision” because that 
possibility could be attributed to the situation, not ICE, and, in any event, the court could 
not “conclude that the length of time here amounted to ‘fundamental unfairness.’”  J.A. 
12.  It ultimately determined that Chaves-Leiva “was unable to articulate any specific 
action [by ICE] that might be deemed coercive” and “did not demonstrate that he was 
intimidated or unable to assert his rights.”  J.A. 10, 13.  
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Chaves-Leiva entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of illegal reentry, 
reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss, and was sentenced to 
eight months of imprisonment.1  He now appeals. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and 
we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  When 
reviewing the District Court’s disposition of Chaves-Leiva’s attempt to attack his 2008 
removal collaterally, we will uphold the court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous, but review de novo its legal conclusions.  Richardson v. United States, 558 
F.3d 216, 219 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009).  
III. 
An element of Chaves-Leiva’s offense of illegal reentry is the existence of a 
removal order.  United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 2004).  The Supreme 
Court in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837–39 (1987), held that an 
immigrant may collaterally attack such an administrative order in a criminal case, but 
only in limited circumstances.  Those circumstances were later codified in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(d), which provides that: 
                                              
1 Although Chaves-Leiva has served his sentence and has been removed, his 
appeal is not moot.  “When [a] defendant challenges his underlying conviction, th[e 
Supreme] Court’s cases have long presumed the existence of collateral consequences,” 
permitting the defendant “to continue his appeals after the expiration of his sentence.”  
United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011) (emphasis omitted); see also 
United States v. Huff, 703 F.3d 609, 611 (3d Cir. 2013) (acknowledging this 
presumption).   
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In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien may not 
challenge the validity of the [removal] order . . . unless the alien 
demonstrates that—   
(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that 
may have been available to seek relief against the order;  
(2) the [removal] proceedings at which the order was 
issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity 
for judicial review; and  
(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.   
 
8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).  Because the three requirements of § 1326(d) are conjunctive, each 
must be satisfied to pursue a collateral challenge to a removal order.  Torres, 383 F.3d at 
99.  In addition, it is the defendant who bears the burden of proof as to each of the three 
requirements.  Richardson, 558 F.3d at 223. 
 This case turns upon whether the entry of Chaves-Leiva’s 2008 removal order was 
fundamentally unfair.  As we have recognized, a defendant may establish fundamental 
unfairness when both “[1] there was a fundamental defect in the proceeding[,] and [2] the 
defect caused him prejudice.”  Id. at 224; see also United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 
347, 358 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review whether the District Court erred in finding no 
fundamental unfairness in entry of the 2008 removal order.2  We conclude that the court’s 
findings were not clearly erroneous.   
                                              
2 The arguments pursued by Chaves-Leiva have evolved over the course of time.  
On appeal, Chaves-Leiva chiefly argues that his removal order was fundamentally unfair 
because of an alleged regulatory violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b), which he suggests 
requires procedures beyond an IJ’s review of the Stipulated Request.  But § 1003.25(b) 
was not even mentioned in his opening brief before the District Court.  We need not 
address Chaves-Leiva’s regulatory argument because we will affirm the District Court’s 
finding of no fundamental unfairness, for the reasons discussed herein.   
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 An order of removal stipulated to by the immigrant and the agency — like the one 
at issue here — may be entered by an IJ “without a hearing . . . based on a review of the 
charging document, the written stipulation, and supporting documents, if any.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.25(b).  “If the alien is unrepresented, the [IJ] must determine that the alien’s 
waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”  Id.   
Chaves-Leiva argued before the District Court that he did not voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to a hearing because he was pressured into 
signing the Stipulated Request, which was not adequately explained to him, and he did 
not receive an explanation of potential defenses to removal.  After a full evidentiary 
hearing and upon consideration of the record, the District Court rejected Chaves-Leiva’s 
arguments.  It found that Chaves-Leiva had been advised in Spanish of his rights, the 
existence of possible defenses, and the consequences of executing the Stipulated Request.  
The court did not believe Chaves-Leiva’s “claim that he did not understand his rights as 
of 2008,” given his “careful[] formulat[ion of] certain answers” during the hearing and 
his strategic misrepresentation of his country of origin as Mexico during earlier 
apprehensions at the border (which allowed him to avoid detention and “be immediately 
returned across the border”).  J.A. 13–14.  And the District Court found that Chaves-
Leiva was not pressured by ICE into signing the Stipulated Request, but rather that the 
document was prepared after Chaves-Leiva requested it.  Finally, the court rejected the 
argument that “the prospect of quick resolution of the case” upon signing the Stipulated 
Request “undermined the voluntariness of Mr. Chaves-Leiva’s decision,” finding that 
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“the difference in time between agreeing to stipulate to removal and seeking a hearing 
before an immigration judge was not oppressive.”  J.A. 12.   
Having reviewed the record, there was no clear error in the District Court’s factual 
findings.  See Richardson, 558 F.3d at 219 n.3.  The Stipulated Request and NOR 
explicitly informed Chaves-Leiva, in Spanish, of his rights and the existence of potential 
defenses.3  It is undisputed that Chaves-Leiva can “read, write and understand Spanish,” 
and that he signed both documents.  J.A. 100.  The agent testified that his signature on the 
Stipulated Request indicated his “understanding [that the immigrant] had an opportunity 
to read or have [the document] read to [him].”  J.A. 206.  Indeed, by signing the form, the 
agent “certif[ied] that . . . [he] ha[d] explained the contents and meaning of th[e] 
document to [Chaves-Leiva] in the language which [he] underst[ood].”  J.A. 46.  And 
Chaves-Leiva certified on the Stipulated Request that “all the information [he] ha[d] 
given” therein was “true and correct,” including his statement that he had read or had 
read to him the entire Stipulated Request.  J.A. 45.   
And there is ample support for the District Court’s finding that Chaves-Leiva was 
not pressured into signing the Stipulated Request.  Although Chaves-Leiva testified that 
                                              
3 We are well aware of the “grave consequences of removal” to immigrants, as 
well as their families and others.  Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Immigration laws and procedures are complex and can be highly confusing to those 
acting pro se.  But there is no right to an appointed attorney in immigration proceedings, 
and many immigrants cannot afford an attorney.  We laud those attorneys who assist 
immigrants for little or no money.  In this case, the District Court found that lists of such 
attorneys were available to Chaves-Leiva, see J.A. 10, and the Stipulated Request signed 
by him acknowledged that he was “provided a copy of the List of Free Legal Services 
Providers,” J.A. 42.  See also J.A. 360 (advising of the availability of a list of no-cost 
attorneys and organizations).       
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the ICE agent approached him with the waiver “three to four times a week” for one 
month before he signed it, Chaves-Leiva was only detained for approximately two weeks 
before he signed the Stipulated Request, and the agent explicitly denied any recollection 
of approaching an immigrant with the form “without [his] making a request,” let alone 
“going to see someone three or four times in a week and bringing the form and asking 
[him] to sign it.”  J.A. 103, 207–08.  Instead, the ICE agent testified that, according to his 
practice, a request by an immigrant “would have caused [him] to generate” the Stipulated 
Request, and, indeed, the record reveals that Chaves-Leiva submitted an inmate service 
request form that was referred to ICE on March 6, 2008 and returned on March 12, 2008, 
the day after he executed the Stipulated Request.  J.A. 200.  Moreover, the ICE agent 
testified that it was his practice to give immigrants as much time as they needed to read 
an NOR and a stipulated request, and that he did not recall ever rushing an immigrant 
through either document.   
Based on this record, we conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in 
finding that Chaves-Leiva voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently signed the Stipulated 
Request.4  And we agree with the court’s legal conclusion flowing from that finding.  
                                              
4 Chaves-Leiva appears to argue that the District Court did not actually determine 
that his waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent because it “never purported to 
make any findings about [his] state of mind when he signed the waiver.”  Chaves-Leiva 
Reply Br. 11.  We reject this argument.  Chaves-Leiva’s motion to dismiss the indictment 
was premised on the argument that his “waiver of rights contained in the Stipulated 
Request was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.”  J.A. 28.  That is the motion that the 
court denied.  In doing so, it carefully addressed the bases upon which Chaves-Leiva 
relied to challenge the validity of the Stipulated Request and found that he had failed to 
demonstrate fundamental unfairness.  That the court did not use the phrase “voluntary, 
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That is, because the District Court found that Chaves-Leiva voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived his rights, it properly concluded that Chaves-Leiva failed to establish 
fundamental unfairness and therefore could not succeed on his attempted collateral 
attack, warranting a denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.5 
IV.  
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court 
denying Chaves-Leiva’s motion to dismiss his indictment.   
                                              
knowing, and intelligent” does not detract from its conclusion that the waiver at issue was 
valid. 
5 To establish fundamental unfairness for the purposes of a collateral attack, 
Chaves-Leiva must prove both a fundamental defect and prejudice.  Richardson, 558 F.3d 
at 224.  Because Chaves-Leiva has not identified a fundamental defect, we decline to 
consider whether he has proven prejudice.  See id. at 224 n.8 (finding no need to “reach 
the issue of whether [the alien] ha[d] demonstrated prejudice” in part “because we ha[d] 
already determined . . . that there was no fundamental defect in the deportation 
proceedings”). 
